Abstract-Quantitative estimates of the impacts of climate change on economic outcomes are important for public policy. We show that the vast majority of estimates fail to account for well-established uncertainty in future temperature and rainfall changes, leading to potentially misleading projections. We reexamine seven well-cited studies and show that accounting for climate uncertainty leads to a much larger range of projected climate impacts and a greater likelihood of worst-case outcomes, an important policy parameter. Incorporating climate uncertainty into future economic impact assessments will be critical for providing the best possible information on potential impacts.
I. Introduction L EADING economics and social science journals have published an increasing number of articles in recent years on the projected effects of global climate change on important outcomes, including aggregate economic activity, agriculture, and health. Results of these studies have featured prominently in public policy debates, informing decisions about appropriate investments in greenhouse gas emissions reductions, as well as in measures designed to help societies adapt to a changing climate. Such investments represent potentially large amounts of resources. For instance, a high-profile assessment concluded that expected future climate damages warrant an immediate annual investment of 1% to 2% of global GDP to avoid the worst effects of climate change (Stern, 2007) .
1 Similarly, the 2009 US$100 billion pledged in annual transfers from rich to poor countries to help the latter adapt to expected climate impacts is close to the total current annual foreign aid transfer from rich to poor countries.
2 Generating credible estimates of climate impacts is thus of considerable public concern.
As in empirical work more broadly, climate impact estimates could be expected to provide both a best guess of potential impacts-that is, an unbiased point estimate-as well as a sense of the uncertainty around this estimate. Unfortunately, a methodological flaw common in many recent impact studies results in their often providing neither the best guess of possible impacts nor an appropriate characterization of the uncertainty. To quantify potential impacts, these studies typically combine estimates of the historical relationship between climate variables and outcomes of interest with projections of future changes in climate, the latter typically derived from global climate models. Although such studies are typically careful to document the statistical uncertainty inherent in the historical relationship between climate variables and outcomes of interest, they rarely account for the large degree of climate uncertainty found in existing projections of climate change itself. Studies overwhelmingly rely on projections from only one or a handful of climate models, despite the availability of over twenty such models that are in wide use in the climate science community, the frequently large discrepancies across models, and the lack of evidence that any particular subset of models is more reliable than others for long-term projections (Randall et al., 2007; Meehl et al., 2007) . Our survey of this growing literature reveals that of the nearly 200 papers that make quantitative climate impact projections for economic, political, or social outcomes, the median number of climate models used is just two, with disproportionate dependence on only a few of the over twenty recognized models. Many studies rely on a single model, the Hadley Centre Climate Model, 3 despite the lack of systematic evidence that it is any more trustworthy than alternatives, and the ready availability of data from at least fifteen models since at least 2000.
Because climate models can disagree on both the magnitude and even the sign of future changes in key climate variables, point estimates using a single projection of future climate can mislead, and the range of possible outcomes around this point estimate will be substantially understated if the full extent of climate uncertainty is not taken into account. Failure to incorporate this uncertainty into impact studies thus renders much of the rapidly growing literature on the economics of climate change a potentially poor guide for public policy.
In this paper, we-a team of climate scientists and social scientists-provide a readily usable analytical approach that addresses the role of climate uncertainty in estimates of climate change impacts. To illustrate our approach, we reexamine data from seven well-cited articles in the climate impacts literature that explore potential impacts on various outcomes, including agricultural productivity, economic growth, and civil conflict. To isolate the role of climate uncertainty from other study characteristics that might also affect impact estimates-for instance, authors' choices about the study sample or econometric specification-we remain agnostic on these choices and focus attention on the authors' own preferred analytical approach in each study. The results we present here are thus not meant to provide definitive impact projections for particular outcomes but instead to demonstrate the importance of accounting for climate uncertainty in generating such projections.
We show that accounting for climate uncertainty in these studies is consequential, yielding different point estimates, a much wider range of projected impacts, and far more negative worst-case scenarios, relative to an approach that only considers uncertainty in the historical relationship between climate variables (such as temperature and precipitation) and the outcome of interest. In fact, even with perfect knowledge of the mapping from climate to outcomes, climate uncertainty alone generates a wide range of potential impacts: depending on the choice of climate model, impacts of climate on U.S. farmland values can shift up or down by half a trillion dollars by the mid-twenty first century, GDP per capita growth in poor countries could decline over that period by anywhere between a fifth to a half (relative to a world without climate change), and the incidence of African civil conflict could increase by ''just'' 40 percentage or could double. For analysts and policymakers interested in the left tail of the climate change impact distribution (Weitzman, 2009), we show that failing to account for climate uncertainty greatly understates the severity of the worst-case scenario in most articles we examine.
There are also instances when accounting for climate uncertainty is less important. In particular, when an analysis can rule out a meaningful historical relationship between climate and the outcome of interest (i.e., the relationship between climate and the outcome is a precise zero), then any change in future climate will be projected to have similarly minimal impacts on that outcome. In other words, and unsurprisingly, when climate does not affect a particular outcome, neither does climate uncertainty. Nevertheless, because most papers in this literature either find meaningful historical impacts of climate, or at least are unable to definitively rule them out, our results suggest that accounting for climate uncertainty will substantially shape impact estimates in most settings of interest.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section II presents a thorough literature review that documents the use of global climate models in economics and social science research and presents novel quantitative evidence on the widespread failure of recent studies to take climate uncertainty into account. Section III presents our approach and quantifies the importance of accounting for climate uncertainty when estimating potential impacts across a range of economic outcomes. The final section concludes with specific suggestions for how climate uncertainty should be incorporated into future research.
II. Climate Models in Recent Economics and Social
Science Research
A. The Science of Modeling Climate Change
A basic overview of climate science models and terminology is useful before we discuss the recent economics literature on the impacts of climate change. The science of understanding past changes in climate and projecting possible future changes has evolved rapidly. The main tools for projecting future climate are coupled general circulation models (GCMs), which are detailed computer models that numerically approximate fundamental physical laws at time and space scales appropriate for representing global climate (Randall et al., 2007) . These models are coupled in the sense that the interaction of different components of the climate system-the ocean with the atmosphere, for example-is explicitly included in the numerical calculations. Many such models are currently in use, reflecting efforts by different research groups around the world to develop ever more refined representations of the complex physical processes that determine the state of the climate.
There are two basic sources of uncertainty in model projections of future changes in climate: imperfect knowledge of the future trajectories of variables that might affect the climate system (most notably, greenhouse gas emissions) and imperfect knowledge of how changes in these variables translate into changes in climate. The former we will refer to as emissions uncertainty and the latter simply as climate uncertainty.
Emissions uncertainty is typically captured by running a given climate model under multiple future emissions scenarios. To facilitate cross-model comparability, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) developed a standardized set of these scenarios, some subset of which almost all modeling groups use as inputs into their modeling efforts. Known as the SRES scenarios (from the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios), they employ different assumptions about economic growth and technological change to span a range of different rates of change in anthropogenic (man-made) radiative forcing. These scenarios provide the basis for the various climate model projections reported in the IPCC's assessment of the state of the science, the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report, in part for which it was awarded the Nobel Prize. 4 Conditional on the use of a particular emissions scenario, climate uncertainty derives from the different modeling choices climate science research groups make about how to best represent the underlying physical relationships and about what baseline conditions should be used to initialize the models.
While emissions are uncertain from the perspective of the econometrician, they are in principle a policy choice and are typically treated differently in the climate science community than is the uncertainty in how the climate system responds to a given level of emissions. In particular, even given a perfectly defined trajectory of anthropogenic emissions, climate projections will still be subject to uncertainty arising from lack of perfect knowledge of the physi-4 A new framework for emissions scenarios is now being used to allow exploration of a wider range of possible climate policies and more rapid response to relevant research for future IPCC assessments (Moss et al., 2010) .
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cal processes at work (often termed model uncertainty) and from inherent, chaotic variability (internal variability) within the climate system that is manifest in a large sensitivity to initial conditions. Although these uncertainties may be reduced through further research, the rate of progress has been fairly slow, and there are fundamental limits to the reduction of uncertainty associated with initial conditions (Deser et al., 2012) . Therefore, to ensure that we are not conflating policy uncertainty with more fundamental physical uncertainty, we focus primarily on the role of the latter in what follows.
To begin illustrating the extent of climate uncertainty, figure 1 presents projections of climate change in primary U.S. agricultural regions between 2000 and 2080 to 2100, using output from twenty climate models contributing to the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report.
5 Climate models uniformly predict that temperatures will warm over U.S. agricultural regions, but disagree on both the sign and magnitude of precipitation changes. Furthermore, within an emissions scenario, the variation in model predictions can be large. In the oft-used A1B scenario, for instance, the projected mean temperature across the full ensemble of twenty models increases by 3.58C (6.38F), but the range containing 95% of the predictions is large, from roughly 28C (3.68F) to 68C (10.88F).
6 For precipitation, the ensemble mean projected change is close to 0, but individual models project growing season precipitation rising or falling by as much as 20%. Recall that these differences across models are driven by assumptions made in the scientific modeling of climate rather than uncertainty about future greenhouse gas emissions.
An immediate question is how researchers should treat this range of climate projections. One tempting solution, and the implicit (or explicit) approach of the vast majority of the literature surveyed below, is to identify a single model or small subset of models that appears more trustworthy and use only their output in impact projections. This approach underestimates the uncertainty associated with long-term climate projection in at least two ways. First, in cases where only a single realization (that is, one run from a single set of initial conditions) for a single model is used, the uncertainty arising from internal variability (i.e., sensitivity to initial conditions) is neglected. This uncertainty due to internal variability can be large relative to other sources of uncertainty, especially for projections over the next few decades and for precipitation (Hawkins & Sutton, 2009) . Second, even when multiple realizations of a single model are used, an analysis based on a single model ignores the uncertainty associated with incomplete knowledge of all relevant physical processes (i.e., model uncertainty). Since the climate science literature finds little evidence that particular models consistently outperform others or that any measure of performance on past climate observations helps to meaningfully narrow the future range of climate projections (Knutti, 2010; Tebaldi & Knutti, 2007; Gleckler, Taylor, & Doutriaux 2008) , there is no reasonable climate scientific rationale for restricting analysis to a single model or small number of models. In contrast to the recent economics of climate change literature and as evidence of this point, most studies of future climate impacts carried out by climate scientists are characterized by model ''democracy'' (Knutti, 2010) . In this method, each model that meets IPCC standards gets one ''vote,'' and the votes are combined into an ensemble projection whose distribution is then characterized (Meehl et al., 2007) .
B. The Social Science Literature on Climate Change Impacts
We conducted an extensive review of the climate impact literature, with particular attention to papers that use cli- figure 1A in the appendix. Actual model output is compiled and made publicly available in a standard data format by the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project of the World Climate Research Programme (http://cmip-pcmdi .llnl.gov/). The models used in this paper are BCCR, CCCMA.t63, NCAR .CCSM, CCRM, CSIRO, ECHAM, GFDL_CM2.0, GFDL_CM2.1, GISS .AOM, GISS.EH, GISS.ER, HADcm3, HADGEM1, IAP, INMCM3, IPSL, MIROC.Hires, MIROC.Medres, MRI, and NCAR.PCM, which together constitute nearly all of the available ensembles and the models with the appropriate combination of twentieth-and twenty-first-century runs for our analysis at the time of writing. Not all models report projections for all emissions scenarios. We have access to eighteen models reporting projections for both the A1B and B1 scenarios and fifteen models reporting for the A2 scenario. For a useful overview of available model output, refer to http://www-pcmdi.llnl.gov/ipcc/about_ipcc.php. 6 The popularity of the A1B scenario is due to its assumptions of robust economic growth, moderate increases in global population, rapid adoption of technology, and balanced reliance on fuel sources (hence ''B''). 463 CLIMATE UNCERTAINTY AND CLIMATE IMPACTS mate model information to make quantitative projections about the impacts of climate change on economic, political, and social outcomes. We adopted a broad definition of climate model, including in our review papers using explicit output from GCMs (the majority) as well as other papers that used quantitative climate projections of any kind, such as simple uniform warming scenarios of, say, a 18C increase in temperature. Outcomes of interest included estimates of sector-specific or economy-wide damages resulting from climate change, as well as estimates of climate impacts on outcomes with clear economic consequences, such as on agricultural productivity, water resources, human morbidity and mortality, or violent conflict. We limited our search to peer-reviewed published articles, as well as unpublished papers in well-known working paper series, such as the NBER and World Bank's Policy Research series.
These search criteria yielded a large number of studies. Our review is almost surely an underestimate of the total number of papers in this literature, but it captures the most highly cited work as well as much of the recent work (over half of the papers we reviewed were published in 2007 or later). 7 The total number of studies we review are shown in the left panel of figure 2. As shown in the figure, studies focusing on agricultural impacts account for the majority of the published studies, although their share has fallen in recent years.
Social scientists' use of climate models is surprising in light of climate scientists' general preference for the democratic use of climate model output. Among the nearly 200 papers that made quantitative projections of future climate impacts, the median number of climate models used is just two (table 1) . Studies on the agricultural impacts of climate change, accounting for 53% of all articles, do little better: the median number of climate models used is three. Research on climate impacts in other sectors, such as health and water resources, shows similar patterns.
The median number of climate models used has also been roughly unchanged since scientific concern about climate 
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change began in earnest in the early 1990s, as shown in the right panel of figure 2 . Importantly, this is despite the fact that since at least 2000, output from at least fifteen climate models has been publicly available in a central online database.
8
It might be more defensible to use only a small subset of the available climate model ensemble if researchers drew their subset of models at random. For instance, given the distribution of temperature projections for U.S. agriculture, simple simulations suggest that two models drawn at random will, in expectation, capture roughly 35% of the total ensemble range of temperature projections (results available on request). However, researchers do not appear to be drawing models randomly. Despite the availability of over twenty IPCC-recognized models, researchers show a strong preference for models from one particular research group, the Hadley Centre (in the United Kingdom), perhaps because their data were historically available to researchers in a particularly user-friendly format. Roughly half of the studies we reviewed used Hadley models, and nearly a sixth of all the studies used only a Hadley model.
9
This use of models is particularly troubling given that projections from the Hadley models do not always reflect the central tendency of the full ensemble of climate models. As figure 1 shows for U.S. agricultural regions, precipitation projections from the most recent coupled model from the Hadley Centre are near the ensemble mean, but temperature projections are outside the ensemble interquartile range. Again, the climate literature offers no evidence that the Hadley projections are any more (or less) trustworthy than other models, implying that the singular use of Hadley likely yields a poor representation of the range of possible outcomes. We next explore what the overuse of the Hadley model-or any other model or small subset of models, for that matter-implies for projections of climate impacts.
III. Quantifying Climate Uncertainty

A. The Basic Approach
Studies typically proceed in two steps to quantify potential impacts of climate change on outcomes of interest: first, estimate the historical relationship between climate variables and the outcome, and then evaluate these estimates at future changes in climate. To fix ideas, consider the regression specification:
where outcome y in geographic unit i is a function of climate in that location c i , covariates x i , and an error term.
In the simplest setup, researchers model outcomes as a simple linear function of temperature and precipitation,
, with the latter, for example, representing the average temperature or total precipitation over an agricultural growing season in a given location. The b terms are estimated using historical data, and then the projected impacts of climate change are calculated by multiplying these coefficient estimates by projected changes in the relevant climate variables over time (DT and DP here) as derived from global climate models.
The proper derivation of these changes is worth noting. For instance, DT by end of century (2080-2100) is calculated by differencing climate model projected average temperature over 2080 to 2100 in a given area and projected average temperature in that area over the relevant period of historical data, say, 1980 to 2000. The latter are projected because climate model simulations typically exhibit biases for current climate in some regions, meaning observed present-day temperatures and modeled present-day temperatures might not be the same. Differencing future model projected temperatures and current observed temperatures would introduce bias into estimates of temperature changes, and thus the commonly accepted approach is to difference future and current modeled temperature.
10 To quantify climate uncertainty, this calculation is then repeated for each climate model in the IPCC ensemble mentioned above.
The implicit assumption in this approach is that past responses to climate as captured in the b 0 s reflect how outcomes will respond in the future to similar changes in climate, that is, that any future adaptations that agents are able to make in the face of a changing climate are fully reflected in their observed ability to adapt to past changes. While this assumption appears strong, scholars have noted that in at least two domains of interest, agricultural productivity and economic growth, there is surprisingly little evidence that outcomes are less sensitive to long-run shifts in climate than they are to short-run shifts, implying limited adaptation (Schlenker & Roberts, 2009; Burke & Emerick, 2013; Dell, Jones, & Olken, 2012) . Perhaps more important, it is in principle possible to assume any level of future adaptation that the analyst desires by scaling the b 0 s up or down to the desired level. For our purposes here, we follow the studies we review in assuming that future adaptation to climate is reflected in past climate sensitivities, and multiply the b 0 s estimated using historical data by future changes in climate to generate projected impacts.
B. Climate Impacts on Agriculture, Economic Growth, and Civil Conflict
We apply our approach to seven published studies. In keeping with the larger literature, most of the studies we examine focus on potential climate impacts on agriculture, but we also revisit studies that examine impacts on economic growth and civil conflict. We first provide a brief overview of the studies and then demonstrate the importance of climate uncertainty for their projected impacts. As noted above, the social science literature on climate impacts has focused disproportionately on agriculture (table  1) . This is particularly true in economics, where the most cited climate change impacts papers focus almost exclusively on potential damages in U.S. agriculture. Such a focus is understandable: temperature and precipitation enter directly into the agricultural production function, and while U.S. agriculture is not uniquely affected by climate, the United States is the world's largest exporter of agricultural goods and one of its largest overall producers.
12 The outsized impact that fluctuations in U.S. agricultural production have on global food markets thus makes climate impacts there a significant global public policy concern.
In a seminal paper, Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw (1994;  henceforth MNS) use a hedonic approach to relate agricultural land values in U.S. counties to average local climate. If land markets are well functioning (a reasonable assumption in the United States), then the hedonic approach should capture the impact of changes in climate on agricultural production value, net of any adaptive measures that farmers can take in response to a changing climate (e.g., planting different crops or even switching to noncrop income sources). MNS find a muted response of land values to climate and project that climate change could on net in fact benefit U.S. agriculture.
The limitation of this cross-sectional approach is that average local climate could correlate with many other unobserved factors that also affect land values, biasing coefficients on climate variables in an unknown direction. In follow-up work, Schlenker, Hanemann, and Fischer (2005; henceforth SHF) show that irrigation was an important omitted variable in the MNS study and that accounting for irrigation leads to much more negative projected climate impact estimates for U.S. agriculture. More recent work has used panel data to further address omitted variables concerns. Deschenes and Greenstone (2007; henceforth DG) relate county-level deviations in weather to deviations in agricultural profits, finding a limited effect of weather on profits and thus small potential impacts of future climate change on U.S. agricultural profitability. Building on DG, Fisher, Hanemann, Roberts, and Schlenker (2012; henceforth FHRS) adopt DG's county fixed-effects strategy but take issue with DG's data and specification and show that under alternate specifications and updated data, future climate impacts on productivity and profitability could be quite negative. 13 Importantly, these four studies (MNS, SHF, DG, and FHRS) all appeared in the same leading economics research journal, the American Economic Review, and all projected impacts using a single climate model, the Hadley model. There remain substantial disagreements among these studies concerning the appropriate econometric specification of the historical relationship between climate and agricultural outcomes. However, we remain agnostic on these differences in this paper and quantify impacts as would have been obtained by the study authors themselves had they adopted our approach to dealing with climate uncertainty.
We also revisit three other papers examining potential impacts outside U.S. agriculture. Schlenker and Lobell (2010;  henceforth SL) use a panel of African countries over 1961 to 2002 to estimate climate change impacts on the productivity of the primary African crops, finding large historical sensitivities to temperature increases and thus substantial potential losses under future climate change. Burke et al. (2009; henceforth BMSDL) also use a panel of African countries but explore the role of climate in civil war. They find that civil war has been strongly responsive to past variation in temperature in Africa and that future warming could increase the incidence of war. Both SL and BMSDL use multiple climate models (sixteen and twenty, respectively) to project impacts, but we can apply the same approach as in the other studies to quantify the importance of climate uncertainty in overall impact projections and to get a sense of how SL and BMSDL's conclusions might have changed had they not used a large number of climate models.
Finally, Dell, Jones, and Olken (2012) use a global panel of countries over 1950 to 2003 and document a strong negative relationship between economic growth and warmerthan-average temperatures in poor countries (but not rich countries). In the well-cited working paper version of the article (Dell et al., 2008) , they project climate impacts on end-of-century GDP levels using a single climate model, finding large effects on per capita incomes in poor countries but limited overall impact on global GDP as a whole. (The lack of an effect on global GDP results from their finding that rich countries were largely unaffected by changes in temperature over their study period and rich countries account for the vast majority of global income.)
C. Quantifying the Importance of Climate Uncertainty
For each of the seven studies we reexamine, we estimate in figure 3 the impacts by midcentury (2040-2060) associated with each of fifteen to eighteen different climate
